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THE MARYLAND UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT:
A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND CASE LAWt
Milton E. Babirak, Jr.tt

"Your secret is your property." 1
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This article is derived from a law review article entitled The Virginia Uniform
Trade Secret Act: a Critical Summary of the Act and Case Law, 5 VA. J .L. & TECH.
15 (2000), available at www.\jolt.org, and a speech entitled "The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act in the United States" given by the author in Kitzbuhel,
Austria on March 21, 2000, at a Conference on the International Protection
of Intellectual Property, which was sponsored by the Center for
International Legal Studies and co-sponsored by the American Bar
Association's Section on International Law.
tt A shareholder of Babirak, Albert, Vangellow & Shaheen, P.C., 30-C West
Street, Annapolis, Maryland 21401, Phone: (410) 280-1400; Fax: (410) 2801401, E-mail: mbabirak@bavslaw.com, web site: www.bavslaw.com. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Joanna Schindler, Esquire of
Babirak, Albert, Vangellow & Shaheen, P.C., for her review and editing of
this article and to Nancy Anderson for her help with tl1is article.
1. PROVERBS MAxiMS AND PHRASES OF ALL AGES (Robert Christy ed., G. P. Putnam's Sons 1906) (quoting Rothschild).
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INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Uniform Act") 2 was originally
proposed over twenty years ago in the United States by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and now it has
been enacted in most of the individual states. 3 The Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Maryland Act") 4 was enacted in Maryland,
with some modifications to the Uniform Act, and became effective on
July 1, 1989. 5 Just after its enactment in 1990, Peter B. Swann authored an excellent note on the Maryland Act. 6 However, at that
time, there were relatively few reported Maryland cases on the common law of trade secrets and no reported cases litigated under the
Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 7 The purpose of this article, in
addition to reviewing the Maryland Act, is to review over twelve years
of case law in Maryland since the enactment of the Maryland Act and
the publication of Swann's Note. To attempt to accomplish these purposes, this article will: ( 1) briefly review the historical development of
trade secrets law; 8 (2) critically summarize the significant provisions of
the Maryland Act, including a discussion of a few unusual and contro2. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
3. See infra note 60 and accompanying text for the state statutes enacting the
Uniform Act.
4. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000).
5. /d. § 11-1201.
6. Peter B. Swann, Note, Maryland Unifrmn Trade Secrets Act, 49 Mn. L. REv.
1056 (1990).
7. /d. at 1061.
8. See infra notes 15-68 and accompanying text. This article does not cover the
Economic Espionage Act. See generally]. Derek Mason et a!., The Economic
Espionage Act: Federal Protection for Cmporate Trade Secrets, 16 No. 3 CoMPUTER
LAw. 14 (1999), WL 16 No. 3 CLW 14, for a discussion of this topic.
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versial features of the Maryland Act; 9 (3) compare the Maryland Act
and the Uniform Act; 10 and (4) review most of the significant published case law in Maryland concerning the Maryland Act. 11
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE SECRETS LAW

Epigraphical and literary sources clearly establish that trade secrets
have existed for many years. 12 Early businesses had trade secrets, such
as customer lists, secret formulas, methods of production, and vital
business and financial records. 13 Because trade secrets gave an enterprise a competitive advantage, early businessmen must have attempted
to protect their commercially unique processes and records. Surprisingly, however, the early history of the law governing trade secrets is
unclear. 14 There is a debate among classical Greek and Roman scholars regarding the existence of legal protection of trade secrets during
the era when sophisticated Greek and Roman businesses flourished
and traded throughout the known world at that time. 15 One commentator, who cites Justinian and Gaius, argued that during the time
of the late Republic and early Empire, there was a cause of action
called actio servi corrupti that provided a remedy in the Roman law to a
master against a competitor who had enticed a slave to give up one of
his master's secrets. 16 As late as the Middle Ages in Europe, there
does not appear to be any protection of trade secrets through the application of any unified body of trade secret law. 17 At that time, trade
secrets were protected, if at all, through the application of unfair competition laws. 18
A.

Europe

Trade secret law began to develop with the newfound mobility of
labor during the Industrial Revolution in Europe. 19 Some early English trade secret cases were published in the Nineteenth Century. 20
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

See infra 69-115 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts III & IV.
See infra Parts III & IV.
See A. Aurthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 837, 838 n.5 (1930).
See id. See generally jERRY CoHEN & ALAN S. GuTTERMAN, TRADE SECRETS
PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION 5-7 (1998) (hereinafter CoHEN &
GuTrERMAN].
See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
See Schiller, supra note 12, at 837-38.
Id. at 839 & n.18.
Id. at 837.
Id.
The relationship between current trade secret law and the mobility of employees is discussed in Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Pr~
tection and the Mobility of Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47
S.C. L. REv. 659 (1996).
See COHEN & GuTrERMAN, supra note 13, at 6 & nn.8-9.
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One such case was the 1851 case of Morison v. Moat. 21 In Morison, the
plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from using a secret for compounding a medicine named "Morison's Universal
Medicine." 22 The defendant had acquired knowledge of the secret
process to make the medicine, which was not patented, in violation of
a contract and in breach of good faith. 23 However, this case was not
the first trade secret case of industrial England. 24 The Vice-Chancellor, who wrote the opinion, noted that by 1851 the court had heard
trade secret cases before and stated " [ t] hat the Court has exercised
jurisdiction in cases of this nature does not, I think, admit of any
question." 25
B.

Early American Trade Secret Case Law

Possibly the first reported American case involving trade secrets was
the 1837 case of Vickery v. Welch, 26 which involved the sale of a chocolate mill in Braintree, Massachusetts. 27 In the sales agreement for the
mill, the seller agreed to sell the mill, to convey to the buyer the secret
as to how to make the chocolate, and to deliver a written assurance
that he would not give the secret to anyone else. 28 Two or three other
persons in the company had knowledge of the seller's secret, but they
had given a written oath not to divulge it. 29 The buyer tendered the
consideration. 30
Upon advice of counsel, the seller refused to tender to the buyer
the written promise not to convey his secret art to others. 31 The seller
argued that if he so bound himself, it would be an unlawful restraint
of trade. 32 The Massachusetts court upheld the terms of the contract
and ordered the seller not to disclose the secret to others. 33 The
court reached the conclusion that there was no restraint of trade in
this case because it was "of no consequence to the public whether the
secret art be used by the plaintiff or by the defendant." 34
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch. 1851).
Jd. at 493.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 498. The court stated that "[t]he case of Green v. Folgham . .. where
the Court decreed an account against a party to whom a secret of this nature had been entrusted, might perhaps be accounted for upon the ground
that the Defendant in that case had expressed himself to be trustee of the
secret." !d. (citations omitted).
Id.
36 Mass. 523 ( 1837).
Jd.
Id. at 523-24.
Jd. at 524.
Id.
Jd.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 527.
Id.
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The earliest reported case in Maryland that specifically involved an
alleged trade secret was possibly Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Edward
]ohnson. 35 This may have been Maryland's earliest case because the
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that it could not locate any prior
decisions in the court of appeals, nor could it find any decisions that
dealt specifically with trade secrets. 36 The case involved a list of customers on a laundry route used by an employee of the laundry company.37 The employee left the laundry company and used the list to
start his own business. 38 The court held that the identity of the customers on the laundry route was not a trade secret:
The decisions in this country and in England seem to be
fairly harmonious in principle as to the duty of courts to protect owners of trade secrets from disclosure by employees,
but the divergences begin when the question to be determined in particular cases is, whether the thing sought to be
protected should be classed as a trade secret. And this is the
real question presented in this case.
A thing can hardly be said to be a secret, in the sense that it
should be guarded by a court of equity, which is susceptible
of discovery by observation, and which is open to the observation of any one who thinks it worth while to observe. 39
C.

Judiciary Attempts to Formulate a Legal Theory to Encompass Trade
Secrets

As more and more of these early cases were heard in England and
America, the judiciary attempted to formulate a unified comprehensive legal theory to justify the protection of trade secrets. In the above
mentioned 1851 case of Morison v. Moat, 40 the English court was already focusing on the theoretical basis for the protection of trade
secrets:
[D]ifferent grounds have indeed been assigned for the exercise of that jurisdiction. In some cases it has been referred to
property, in others to contract, and in others, again, it has
been treated as founded upon trust or confidence, meaning,
as I conceive, that the Court fastens the obligation on the
conscience of the party, and enforces it against him in the
same manner as it enforces against a party to whom a benefit
is given the obligation of performing a promise on the faith
of which the benefit has been conferred; but, upon whatever
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753 (1922).
/d. at 361, 117 A. at 753.
/d. at 360, 117 A. at 753.
/d.
/d. at 361,117 A. at 753.
See supra notes 21-24.
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grounds the jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no
doubt as to the exercise of it. 41
Even today, there does not appear to be any singular underlying
legal theory to justify the protection of trade secrets. While the need
for the protection of such secrets is virtually uncontroverted in most
Western countries, the several legal theories used to justify trade secret legislation do so only partially and inadequately. 42

1.

Property Right of Owner

Early trade secret cases and some current trade secret cases justify
the protection of trade secrets as a property right of the owner of the
trade secret. 43 However, this theory does not work in all cases. For
example, trade secret law provides that the owner of a trade secret has
no right to protect it if that secret is acquired by others who develop it
on their own by proper means. 44 Also, protection of a trade secret will
be lost, and others will be able to exploit it, if the secret is inadvertently or even improperly disclosed to the public or if the secret enters
the public domain. 45 Clearly, these examples are inconsistent with
the concept of protection of a trade secret based on a property right.
2.

Contract Theory

Contract theory is another basis asserted for the protection of trade
secrets. 46 However, this theory has limited applicability because in
many cases a written contract does not exist between the owner of the
trade secret and the misappropriator of the trade secret. 47 The misappropriator may even be a complete stranger to the owner of the trade
secret. 48 A frequent example is the case of a departing employee who
misappropriates a trade secret from his employer. Typically, the employee in this type of scenario has not executed a non-disclosure of
proprietary information agreement or an employment agreement that
covers trade secrets. 49
3.

General Duty of Good Faith

Recognizing the obvious inadequacies of the use of the property
theory and the contract theory to justify the protection of trade
secrets, legal scholars and jurists advanced the theory that the protec41. 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 498 (Ch. 1851).
42. See generally Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation (pt. 2),J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 5 (2000).
43. COHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 12.
44. /d.
45. /d.
46. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SEcRETs: A PRACTITIONER's GuiDE 6 (1994).
47. /d.
48. See, e.g., DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir 2001).
49. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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tion of trade secrets is justified on the basis of a general duty of good
faith. 50 Simply stated, the protection of a person who possesses a
trade secret from another, who misappropriates it by improper or unlawful means, is an issue of fundamental fairness. 5 1
4.

Encourage Development of Technology

Finally, it has been argued that trade secret protection is justified,
like patents, to encourage inventors and investors to create, innovate,
and develop new technologies by protecting their inventions and investments and allowing them to profit thereby. 52
D.

The Restatement Sheds New Light

Regardless of the absence of a singular and comprehensive underlying theory justifying the protection of trade secrets, during the early
Twentieth Century, the number of trade secret cases began to increase substantially. 53 Concurrently, prominent American legal scholars and jurists began to draft the first Restatement to set forth the
general principles of law in an attempt to foster a uniformity in the
laws of the various states. 54 In 1939, in recognition of this growing
body of trade secret case law, the drafters of the first Restatement included an important new definition of a trade secret. 5 5 Comment b of
section 757b of the Restatement of the Law of Torts defined a trade secret
as any "formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives [the user] an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." 56
E.

The Uniform Act

Mter the publication of the first Restatement's definition of trade secret, it was widely applied by the judiciary to the increasing numbers
of trade secret cases in the United States. 5 7 In 1969, the United States
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("Con50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974).
/d.
/d. at 484.
See generally Robert T. Neufeld, Note, Mission Impossible: New York Cannot Face
the Future Without a Trade Secret Act, 7 FoRDAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
LJ. 883 ( 1997).
CoHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 18.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TORTS§ 757 cmt. b (1939).
/d.
See, e.g., Associated Perfumers, Inc. v. Andelman, 55 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Mass.
1944) (holding that merchandising methods do not fall under the definition of trade secrets); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50
N.Y.S.2d 643, 66, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that the process for bonding
aluminum to steel qualified as a trade secret); Pitt. Cut Wire Co. v. Sufrin,
38 A.2d 33, 34 (Pa. 1944) (holding that a paper clip machine that the defendant learned of while employed by the plaintiff was not a trade secret).
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ference") organized a Committee ("Committee") to develop a uniform trade secret act. The Committee considered the definition of a
trade secret used in the first Restatement and formulated the Uniform
Act's definition of a trade secret, relying heavily on the definition
found in the first Restatement. 58 In 1979, the Conference adopted the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Uniform Act") and, in 1985, it made important amendments to the Uniform Act. 59
The Uniform Act soon became recognized in the various states as a
model for legislation. Currently, forty-two of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia have enacted a version of the Uniform Act, each
state varying its legislation to some degree from the Uniform Act. 60
58. For a discussion of the evolution of the various definitions of trade secrets
in the Restatements since the first Restatement in 1939, see Kitch, supra note
19, 660-62.
59. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 434 Commissioner's prefatory note.
60. The effective dates of each of the state statutes and the citation to the act in
the state code are: ALA. CooE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (1993) (entered effect
Aug. 12, 1987); ALAsKA STAT.§§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.945 (Michie 2000) (entered effect Sept. 2, 1988); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-401 to 44-407 (West
1994) (entered effect Sept. 27, 1990); ARK. CoDE ANN.§§ 4-75-601 to 44-75607 (Michie 2001) (entered effect Mar. 12, 1981); CAL. Crv. CooE §§ 3426
to 3426.11 (West 1997) (entered effect Jan. 1, 1985); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-110 (West 1999) (entered effect July 1, 1986); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1997) (enacted June 23, 1983); DEL
CooE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (1999) (entered effect Apr. 15, 1982);
D.C. CooE ANN. §§ 48-501 to 48-510 (2000) (enacted effect Mar. 16, 1989);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001 to 668.009 (Supp. 2001) (entered effect Oct. 1,
1988); GA. CoDE ANN.§§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-767 (2000) (entered effectJuly 1,
1990); HAw. REv. STAT.§§ 482B-1 to 482B-9 (1993) (entered effectJuly 1,
1989); IDAHO CoDE §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (Michie 1997) (entered effect
1989); 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 1065/l to 1065/9 (West 2001) (entered effect Jan. 1, 1988); IND. CooE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8 (Michie
1996) (enacted Feb. 25, 1982); IowA CooE ANN. §§ 550.1 to 550.8 (West
1997) (enacted Apr. 27, 1990); KAN. STAT ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330
(1994) (entered effect July 1, 1981); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 365-880 to
365-900 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (enacted Apr. 6, 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:1431 to 51:1439 (West 1987) (enactedJuly 19, 1981); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN tit. 10, §§ 1541 to 1548 (West 1997) (entered effect May 22, 1987); Mo.
CoDE ANN., CoM LAw II§§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000) (entered effect july 1,
1989); MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 445.1901 to 445.1910 (West Supp. 2001)
(entered effect Oct. 1, 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 325C.01-325C.08 (West
1995) (entered effectjan. 1, 1981); Miss. CooEANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19
(1999) (entered effectjuly 1, 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 417.450 to 417.467
(West 2001) (entered effect Aug. 28, 1995); MoNT. CooE ANN.§§ 30-14-401
to 30-14-409 (1999) (entered effect 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 87-501 to
87-507 (1999) (entered effect July 8, 1988); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 600A.010 to 600A.100 (1999) (entered effect Mar. 5, 1987); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN.§§ 350-B:1 to 350-B:9 (1995) (entered effectjan. 1, 1990); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7 (Michie 2000) (enacted Apr. 3, 1989);
N.D. CENT. CooE §§ 47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-08 (1999) (entered effectjuly 1,
1983); OHIO REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1333.61 to 1333.69 (West 1993) (entered
effect july 20, 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (West 1995) (entered
effect Nov. 1, 1986); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 646.461 to 646.475 (1999) (entered
effect jan. 1, 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11 (2001) (entered
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Since its adoption by the Conference and enactment by various states,
the Uniform Act has been interpreted and redefined by numerous
state courts. 61 Maryland's judiciary has also provided judicial gloss to
the Uniform Act from the time that the Maryland Uniform Trade
Secrets Act took effect on July 1, 1989. 62

F.

International Trade Secret Law

Because so many states have enacted a version of the Uniform Act,
and because there has been so much litigation based on it, it is plausible to conclude that not only is trade secret law here to stay as a distinct and unified body of law, but that it will also continue to develop
into a more comprehensive body of law in Maryland and throughout
the United States. Other countries are also adopting some form of
trade secrets law. 63 Some of those countries are following the format
and concepts of the Uniform Act. 64 However, some of the United

61.

62.

63.

64.

effect July 1, 1986); S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-8-10 to 39-8-130 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 2001) (entered effect May 21, 1997); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws§§ 37-29-1
to 37-29-11 (Michie 2000) (entered effect July 1, 1988); UTAH CoDE ANN.
§§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9 (2001) (entered effect May 1, 1989); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 4601-09 (Supp. 2001) (entered effect July 1, 1996); VA. CoDE ANN.
§§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343 (Michie 2001) (entered effectJuly 1, 1986); WASH.
REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 19.108.010 to 19.108.940 (West 1999) (entered effect
Jan. 1, 1982); W.VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10 (Michie 1999) (entered effectJuly 1, 1986); W1s. STAT. ANN§§ 134.90 (West 2001) (entered
effect Apr. 24, 1986).
See, e.g., Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 239,
245 (lnd Ct. App. 2001) (applying and discussing the Indiana Trade
Secrets Act); Titus v. Rheitone, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 85, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(same); Home Pride Foods, Inc. v. Johnson, 634 N.W.2d 774, 781 (Neb.
2001) (defining trade secret under Nebraska law); Combs & Assocs., Inc., v.
Kennedy, 555 S.E.2d 634, 639-40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing what constitutes a trade secret under the laws of North Carolina).
See, e.g., Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 372, 411 (D.
Md. 1994) (applying and discussing the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets
Act); Bond v. Polycycle, Inc., 127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970, 977 (1999)
(applying and discussing the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act); Optic
Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 784, 591 A.2d 578, 585 (1991)
(applying and discussing the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act). Many
trade secrets cases are arbitrated, mediated or settled by the parties for various reasons such as cost-effectiveness and privacy. See COHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 225-26, 228, 235.
See, e.g., Yuan Cheng, Legal Protection of Trade Secrets in the People's Republic of
China, 5 PAc. RIM L. & PoL'vJ. 261 (1996) (discussing how the ambiguity of
China's law for preventing unfair competition affects remedies for misappropriating an employer's trade secret). But see Anuja Rajbhandary, Protecting Trade Secrets Through Family Businesses: A Case Study on Nepal, 16 INT'L
REv. L. & EcoN. 483 (1996) (utilizing empirical evidence to demonstrate
that companies opt to hire family members when there are legally unprotected trade secrets within the company).
For example, the Czech and Slovak Republics have enacted trade secret
laws closely following the Uniform Act. See Jennifer Felicia Swiller, The
Secrets of Success: Confidential Business Information in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 497, 505-16 (1994).
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States' major trading partners, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, do not protect their citizens' trade secrets by a distinct and unified body of law. Generally, those countries apply their existing unfair
competition laws to protect their citizens' trade secrets. 65 Further,
while it is frequently said that there is no international treaty concerning the protection and exploitation of trade secrets, the United States
is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("Agreement on Trade"), which requires each signatory to enact legislation for the protection of information. 66 The Agreement on Trade
describes the required legislation using language very similar, if not
identical in some respects, to the Uniform Act. 67 Other than the
Agreement on Trade, there is no international treaty concerning the
protection and exploitation of trade secrets. This may not be surprising because modern trade secret law is still new and developing. However, this may change. 68 Governments of both industrial countries
with multinational businesses and less-developed countries, which desire to promote investments within their country, have good reasons
to seek the international protection of trade secrets.
Ill.

THE MARYLAND UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT

The Maryland Act regulating trade secrets does not violate the
United States· Constitution. 69 While patents, trademarks and copyrights are regulated by federal law, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has held that a state statute regulating trade
secrets is constitutional. In Sears v. Gottschalk, 70 the court concluded
that "the states may protect trade secrets, and we perceive no violation
of the fifth amendment in federal forebearance to permit that power
to be exercised. " 71
From a structural point of view, the Uniform Act is somewhat unusual in that its significant provisions are contained in section 1, which
65. PERRITT, supra note 46, at 572-73.
66. Kitch, supra note 19, at 659-60.
67. The United States is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (entered into force January 1, 1995). Article 39 of this Agreement requires the
United States and other signatories "'to provide legal protection for undisclosed information of private parties when disclosed or used contrary to
honest commercial practices."' Kitch, supra note 19, at 660; see also Raj
Bhala & Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law 1116 (Lexis Law Publishing
1998). Because trade secret law is a matter governed by state law, rather
than federal law, compliance by the United States with the Agreement is
based on state law compliance. !d.
68. See supra notes 12-62 for a short history of trade secret law.
69. Sears v. Gottchalk, 502 F.2d 122 (1974).
70. /d. at 132 (1974) (relying on Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 485 (1974)).
71. !d.
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provides the definitions of the relevant terms found in the Act. 72 The
Maryland Act follows the Uniform Act's format in this regard. 73
A.

Definition of "Trade Secret"

Commentators of the first Restatement clearly recognized that "[a] n
exact definition of a trade secret is not possible." 74 In recognition of
this difficulty, the definition of trade secret found in the Act and the
Maryland Act is not specific. 75 In Section 11-1201 (e) of the Maryland
Act, a trade secret is defined as "information, including but not limited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique or process." 76 This broad definition is similar to the definition found in the first Restatement of Torts, which defined a trade secret
as any "formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." 77
In optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 78 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that: (1) "[t]o the extent that the Restatement presents a
narrower view, the [Maryland] Act pre-empts that definition [of a
trade secret];" 79 and (2) "[a]lthough all of the Restatement's factors
no longer are required to find a trade secret, those factors still provide
helpful guidance to determine whether the information in a given
case constitutes 'trade secrets' within the definition of the statute." 80
In the Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. FMC Corp./Agricultural
Products Group, 81 the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland cited Bond v. Polycycles lnc. 82 for a recitation of the Restatement's six factors:
(i) the extent to which the information is known outside of
his [the employer's] business; (ii) the extent to which it is
known by employees and others involved in his business; (iii)
72. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (noting that in most statutes,
the definition section merely defines terms and does not contain much substantive law, while in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the definition section
contains much of the Act's substantive law).
73. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(e).
74. REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 cmt. b.
75. See Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(e); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr
§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 438.
76. Illinois, Maine, Virginia, and West Virginia have also added the phrase "but
not limited to." 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 165/2(d) (West 2001); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1542(4) (West 1997); VA CooE ANN.§ 59.1-336 (Michie
2001); W.VA. CODE ANN.§ 47-22-(d) (Michie 1999). Alabama requires that
the information posess specific characteristics. ALA. CooE § 8-27-2(1)
(1993).
77. REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 cmt. b.
78. 87 Md. App. 770, 591 A.2d 578 (1991).
79. Id. at 783, 591 A.2d at 585.
80. Id. at 784, 591 A.2d at 585.
81. 107 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2000).
82. 127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970 (1999).
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the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of
the information; (iv) the value of the information to him and
to his competitors; (v) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; and (vi) the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 83
It is significant to note that the definitions in the Maryland Act, the
Uniform Act, and the first Restatement not only cover high-tech trade
secrets, like computer programs, 84 but "low-tech" secrets as well. 85
Some common examples of low-tech trade secrets include customer
lists, 86 pricing information, 87 financial information, 88 marketing strategies,89 and methods of conducting business. 90 In contrast to patent
law, the definitions of trade secrets in the Maryland Act, Uniform Act,
and the Restatement do not require that the information exist in some
tangible format. 91 In fact, the information can be an idea, theory, or
concept. 92 Further, while no Maryland court seems to have specifically addressed the issue, other courts have found that these definitions of trade secrets do not require that the trade secret be novel. 93
Several courts outside of Maryland have held that novelty is not a requirement for a trade secret but that maintaining its secrecy is necessary.94 Unlike patent law, those definitions do not impose any limit
83. Home Paramount, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 692-93.
84. For example, sophisticated mining software as described in Trandes Corp. v.
Guy F. Atkinson, Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993), and analyzing immense volumes of data, discussed in DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp.,
245 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2001).
85. See, e.g., Home Paramount, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (holding that a customer
list is a trade secret).
86. Id. at 692.
87. See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1260 (3d Cir. 1985).
88. Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.
Md. 1998).
89. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982).
90. See Home Paramount, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 693; Optic Graphics, 87 Md. App. at
781, 591 A. 2d at 584.
91. See 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS§ 1.01[1] (2001).
92. See id.
93. Speny Rand Corp., 325 F. Supp. at 1219; Bond, 127 Md. App. at 371, 723 A.2d
at 973.
94. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (noting that
"novelty in the patent law sense, is not required for a trade secret"); Avtec
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 575 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "hallmark of a trade secret is not its novelty but its secrecy"); Space Aero Prods.
Co. v. R.E. Daning Co., 238 Md. 93, 109, 208 A.2d 74, 82 (1965) (explaining
that secrecy is required for 'judicial protection"); Operations Research,
Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 558, 217 A.2d 375, 380
( 1965) (stating that secrecy is an "essential element"); Optic Graphics, Inc.
v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 778, 591 A.2d 578, 587 (1991) (stating that a
requirement for finding something to be a trade secret is that it "be the
subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy").
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on the length of time a trade secret can be protected. While patents
may be protected by statute for twenty years, trade secrets may be protected as long as their secrecy is maintained, they are not generally
known, and they are not readily ascertainable. 95 The Maryland Act
and the Uniform Act require only the acquisition of the trade secret
for misappropriation, excluding any mention of motivation. 96
Significantly, in contrast to patent law, under the Maryland Act, the
Uniform Act, and the Restatement, the right to a trade secret need not
be exclusive. 97 It seems that this concept has been accepted from the
very beginning of trade secret case law. 98 Even the 1851 English case
of Morison v. Moaf 9 refers to the non-exclusivity of trade secrets. 100 By
non-exclusivity, it is meant that two entities, which concurrently but
independently develop the same trade secret, may both acquire rights
to it. 101 For example, a business in Garrett County, Maryland may develop a technique to produce multiple clones of a renowned Maryland law professor in order to provide uniformly excellent legal
instruction throughout the State. That business may seek to protect
that technique as a trade secret. Another business in Baltimore, Maryland may subsequently and independently develop the very same technique102 and also seek to protect it as a trade secret. The Baltimore
company's acquisition, use, and disclosure of that technique is not a
violation of the Garrett County company's trade secret and both com95. 35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (1994) (stating that "such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States ... "); see also Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 475; REsTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757.
96. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201 (c); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1, 14
U.L.A. 437.
97. Compare Mo. CooE ANN. CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201 (c) (3) (making no mention
of an "exclusive" requirement in the definition of trade secret) and RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS§ 757 cmt. a (stating that "[t]he suggestion that one
has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret because he has
a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and rejected")
with 35 U.S.C. § 154(A) (1) (1994) (stating that "[e]very patent shall ...
grant to the patentee, ... the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States"
(emphasis added)) and 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that a patent will not be
issued if "the invention was known or used by others").
98. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
99. 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 500 (Ch. 1851).
100. See id. at 503 (holding that regardless of the fact that another person had
knowledge of the secret, the holder of the secret was entitled to an injunction to prevent the other from producing product derived from secret).
101. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS §757 cmt. a (stating that "[o]ne who discovers
another's trade secret properly ... by independent invention ... is free to
disclose it or use it in his business without liability"),
102. Assume that the differences in linguistic style and sartorial resplendence
between the Garrett County and Baltimore clones are unrelated to the
cloning technique itself and the technique to create both versions of the
clones is the same for both versions.
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panies can protect their secret. However, if the secret becomes generally known, as discussed below, the right to protect the secret is lost. 103
Similarly, if the secrecy of the trade secret is not maintained or if the
trade secret becomes readily ascertainable, the right to protect the
secret is also lost. 1 04
In fact, a plaintiff does not need to have ownership rights in the
trade secret. In DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 105 AT&T unsuccessfully attempted to defend a trade secret misappropriation claim by
arguing that the plaintif;f did not own the trade secret in fee simple. 106
DTM alleged that AT&T misappropriated its trade secret. 107 AT&T
argued that the plaintiff had misappropriated the trade secret from
the federal government and had no right to it. 108 AT&T also argued
that it had separately developed the secret. 109 The defendant argued
that to make a prima facie case, the plaintiff had to show that it owned
the trade secretY 0 At trial, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland disagreed. 111 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision in an opinion that contained an analysis of the problems inherent in the application of traditional property law to the Maryland Act
and trade secrets law generally. 112 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
"fee simple ownership in its traditional sense is not an element of a
trade secrets misappropriation claim in Maryland." 113
While the definitions of a trade secret found in both the Maryland
Act and the Uniform Act are relatively similar to the definition found
in the Restatement, there is at least one significant difference. The Maryland Act and the Uniform Act do not require continuous use of the
trade secret in a business or even any use at all; the first Restatement
requires the trade secret to be used in a businessY 4 The Maryland
Act and the Uniform Act do not require this because it protects the
trade secret of an owner who has not yet begun his business, not yet
had the opportunity or acquired the means to put the trade secret to
use, has temporarily stopped use, or has determined that the secret
103. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 109-10, 208 A.2d. 74, 82
(1965) (stating that "[a]bsolute secrecy is not essential but a substantial
element of secrecy must exist so that there would be difficulty in others
properly acquiring the information").
104. See Swann, supra note 6, at 1059 (stating that "rights in a trade secret persist
as long as the holder maintains the requisite level of secrecy").
105. 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001).
106. See id. at 330.
107. /d. at 331.
108. /d. at 330.
109. /d. at 334.
llO. /d. at 331.
lll. /d.
112. See generally id.
113. /d. at 333.
ll4. See REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS§ 757 cmt. b; Swann, supra note 6, at 1061.
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process or method does not work and wants to protect that negative
information as a trade secret. 115

B.

Definition of Misappropriation

The initial language of the Maryland Act defines the misappropriation of a trade secret in the same manner as section 1 of the Uniform
Act.U 6 Section 11-1201 of the Commercial Law article of the Annotated Code of Maryland begins its definition of misappropriation as
follows:
1. Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by
improper means; or
2. Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who: (i) Used improper means to
acquire knowledge of the trade secret .... 117

It is interesting that both Acts define misappropriation as the mere
acquisition of a trade secret. us In so doing, the Uniform Act's drafters and Maryland's legislators recognized a commercial reality. People who employ improper means to use or disclose a trade secret of
another usually try to cover up those misdeeds, thereby making it difficult to prove their disclosure or use. It makes sense to define misappropriation of a trade secret to include the mere acquisition of a trade
secret, even if a party cannot prove disclosure or use. One can infer
that a person who acquires a trade secret by improper means is almost
certainly doing so to use or disclose it at some time.
The Fourth Circuit has addressed whether the mere acquisition of a
trade secret by improper means is a misappropriation under the Maryland Act. In Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., ug the court held that
the mere acquisition is sufficient and stated that "[t]he [Maryland
Uniform Trade Secrets Act] does not require proof of competition,
but only proof of improper acquisition or improper use." 120 The
court concluded that "[c]onsequently, Atkinson's improper acquisi115. See Swann, supra note 6, at 1062.
116. Compare Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1201(c) with UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS AcT§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437.
117. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201(c)(1-2).
118. Compare id. with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437.
119. 996 F.2d 655, 657 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting the facts in the case involve a
computer program that was acquired and disclosed by defendants).
120. /d. at 665; see also Mo. CoDE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201(c); cf Schalk v.
State, 767 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that acquisition
without use constituted theft of trade secrets); Computer Print Sys., Inc. v.
Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 154 (1980) (stating that the mere acquisition of computer programs through the breach of a duty of confidentiality creates liability); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 757 cmt. c (stating that "mere disclosure
enhances the possibility of adverse use" and may reduce the value of a trade
secret).
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tion and use of the object code constitutes a misappropriation in violation of the MUTSA." 121
The Maryland Act continues its definition of misappropriation to
include the:
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who:
(i) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(ii) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that the person's knowledge of the trade secret was:
1. Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
2. Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
3. Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use .... 122

In this regard, both the Maryland Act and the Uniform Act define
improper means to include "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach
or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means." 123
A common example in Maryland case law of a misappropriation involving the use or disclosure of a trade secret is an employee who
properly obtains a trade secret during the course of his employment,
but subsequently takes it to use for his own benefit. 124 Generally, an
employee is under an obligation to protect, and not divulge, any of
the trade secrets of the employer imparted to the employee in confidence.125 An employee must not use or disclose to third persons, in
competition with the employer, trade secrets such as written lists of
names, or other similar confidential matters, given to the employee by
the employer. 126 However, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, after the termination of employment an employee may use
general information concerning the method of business of the employer and the names of the employer's customers retained in his or
her memory, if not acquired in violation of any duty to the em121.
122.
123.
124.

Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 665.
Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(c)(2).
Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1201 (b).
See Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 32, 382 A.2d 564, 564 (1978)
(discussing a scrap metal processor who brought action against two former
high-level managerial employees who utilized secret knowledge to subsequently form rival corporations); Bond v. Polycycle, Inc., 127 Md. App. 365,
732 A.2d 970 (1999) (noting that a former president was sued after misappropriating technology after he left the company).
125. See infra notes 128-63 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
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player. 127 On the other hand, if the employee departs his employment with information, even if the information is a trade secret, there
is no actionable misappropriation if the employee does not acquire
the trade secret by improper means or use. In Diamond v. T. Rowe Price
Associates, Inc. 128 a departing employee left work and took approximately 10,000 pages of documents with her. 129 Plaintiff offered no
evidence that the former employee acquired the documents by improper means or used or disclosed them. 130 The court held that without such evidence, there was no violation under the Maryland Act. 131
Sometimes, trade secrets are acquired by accident or mistake. The
Maryland Act defines misappropriation to also include:
Disclosure of use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who ... before a material
change of the person's position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake. 132
If a person made a material change in their position before discovering that they had acquired a trade secret by accident or mistake,
there is no misappropriation of a trade secret.
The drafters of the Maryland and Uniform Acts may have inserted
this material change requirement into these Acts in an attempt to balance the property interests of the trade secret owner with the interests
of another who acquired the trade secret by accident or mistake, applying the fairness theory over the property theory. However, the balancing of these interests may be more easily accomplished, as Virginia
has done, without the Maryland Uniform Act's material change requirement.133 This may be achieved by prohibiting the disclosure or
use of a trade secret acquired by accident or mistake if the other had
knowledge of the accident or mistake at the time of his disclosure or
use. If he did not have such knowledge when he disclosed or used it,
the value of the trade secret is still diminished but it is unfair to punish the other person who used or disclosed it because he had no
knowledge. On the other hand, it is fair to punish the other person if
he had such knowledge before he used or disclosed the trade secret.
If the only impact of the Maryland Act provision and the Uniform
Act provision concerning the accidental or mistaken acquisition of a
trade secret was on this very specific and unique fact pattern, these
provisions would probably effect the outcome of relatively few cases.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Dworkin v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 774, 779, 551 A.2d 947, 949 (1989).
852 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1994).
Id. at 412.
/d.
/d. For another Maryland trade secret cases involving a departing em-

ployee, see Optic Graphics, Inc., 591 A.2d. at 578, 87 Md. App. at 770.
132. Mo. CoDE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(c)(2)(iii), (3).
133. VA. CooE ANN.§ 59.1-336 (2001).
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However, these provisions of the Maryland Act and the Uniform Act
may give rise to an unintended opportunity for misappropriators and
can be problematic for a trade secret owner. For example, a misappropriator can falsely argue that it was not until after he used the
trade secret that he found out that he had acquired a trade secret by
accident or mistake. Consequently, it may be difficult for the trade
secret owner to contest the misappropriator's allegation that he did
not know he had acquired a trade secret by mistake or accident until
after he used or disclosed it. The difficulty would be based on the fact
that only the misappropriator would have information concerning the
timing of his knowledge of the trade secret; and the owner may have
difficulty discovering independent evidence to prove the timing of the
misappropriator's knowledge.
A discussion of the definition of the misappropriation of a trade
secret under the Maryland Act or any state uniform trade secrets act is
incomplete without at least briefly identifying a distinctive line of nonMaryland trade secrets cases which are sometimes referred to as the
"inevitable disclosure" or "inevitability" cases. Because the topic of
this Article is limited, and the inevitable disclosures doctrine is controversial and has been addressed by others, this Article will only briefly
describe the doctrine. 134 A discussion of the doctrine may be helpful
even though Maryland case law has not addressed it. The theory of
inevitable disclosure may be useful to Maryland practitioners bringing
or defending cases with similar fact patterns. Courts outside of Maryland have applied this doctrine to enjoin or limit the subsequent employment, by a competitor, of a departing employee, when it is alleged
that it is inevitable that the employee will use or disclose the trade
secrets of his employer when working for the competitor. 135 Significantly, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is utilized in cases where the
employee has not signed, or has even refused to sign, a non-competition agreement or non-disclosure of proprietary information agreement with his prior employer, and where the employee has not
threatened, directly or indirectly, to use or disclose the trade secrets of
his former employer to his new employer. 136 A great deal of contro134. For a fuller discussion and differing views of this doctrine and the related
case law, see Terrence P. McMahon eta!., Inevitable Disclosure: Not So Sure In
The West, NAT'L LJ., May 12, 1997, at C35; Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting
the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a Former Employee Who Never Signed a NonCompete Agreement nor Threatened to Use or Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited
from Working for a Competitor?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 211 ( 1997).
135. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
136. Obviously, courts do not need to apply the doctrine if there were such a
non-competition or non-disclosure agreement because the case could be
decided as a breach of contract case. Similarly, if there was a threat of
disclosure or use, the case could be decided under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, without the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, because
the Act specifically permits an injunction even for the threat of disclosure
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versy has accompanied the inevitable disclosure doctrine 137 because it
limits a worker's right to move to a better job. 138 This right of mobility has been widely recognized 139 and has a long history in Maryland.140 An analysis of these controversial inevitability cases is
illuminating because courts deciding these cases must balance the
right of a worker's job mobility with the right of a trade secret owner
to protect its trade secret. 141 In balancing these rights, the courts set
forth factors used in reaching a decision, thereby more completely
describing the boundaries and features of the two rights.
The three initial inevitable disclosure cases are: B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Wohlgemuth, 142 Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation
& Engineering Corp., 143 and E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American
Potash & Chemical Corp. 144 All three of these cases were decided in the
mid-1960s and involved a similar fact pattern. 145 In each case, the employer was a leader in its industry because of the technology it developed. In B.F. Goodrich Co., the technology was the development of
space suits. 146 In Allis-Chalmers, the technology was advanced fuel injection pumps, 147 and in the American Potash case, it was pigments. 148
In each of these three cases, the competitors of the companies that
owned the trade secrets could not compete successfully because the
competitors lacked the technology owned by the industry leader. 149
The competitors attempted to obtain the technology by hiring away
one of the industry leader's senior scientists or executives who was
directly involved with and intimately familiar with the subject technol-

137.
138.
139.
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

or use. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1202; Swann, supra note 6, at
1068.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
Weinstein, supra note 134, at 211-15.
Id.
Md. Metals v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978) (stating
that "courts have been receptive to the view that every person has or least
ought to have the right to ameliorate his socio-economic status by exercising a maximum degree of personal freedom in choosing employment").
See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
B.F Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102 (noting that the space suits were highaltitude full pressure space suits).
Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 645 (discussing an employee previously of the
Allis-Chalmers division for manufacturing fuel pumps who had joined another company looking for a second source of fuel pumps).
American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430 (describing that plaintiff is the only successful manufacturer of a pigment product and that employee of plaintiff
was hired by defendant to gain access to the knowledge).
Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 650 (manufacturing and design of fuel injection systems and pumps); American Potash, 200 A.2d at 479 (manufacturing
pigments through the chloride process); B.F Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at
102 (engineering and development of space suit).
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ogy of the trade secret. 150 The competitor's purpose was to successfully compete with the plaintiff. In all of these cases, the departing
employee had not signed a non-disclosure of proprietary information
agreement, had not signed a non-competition agreement when hired,
and had not threatened to use or disclose their employers' trade
secrets. 151 In each case, the argument was made that it was inevitable
that the employee would use or disclose the trade secret of his former
employer while he was engaged in the duties for which he was hired
by his new employer. 152
From the dates of these three cases until 1995, there were very few
inevitable disclosure cases decided which were actual inevitable disclosure cases. 153 However in 1995, an interest in these cases was rekindled with the Seventh Circuit's affirmation of an injunction in a new
inevitable disclosure case. In Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 154 Pepsi was marketing and selling a sports drink called "All Sport," which was far behind Quaker Oats' "Gatorade" in market share. 155 Redmond was a
senior executive of a larger Pepsi business unit which included All
Sport. 156 In this position, Redmond knew Alt"Sport's marketing information. 157 Quaker Oats hired Redmond away from Pepsi to work on
its Gatorade and Snapple line. 158 Applying the inevitable disclosure
theory, the lower court granted Pepsi a preliminary injunction against
Redmond and Quaker Oats, prohibiting Redmond from any beverage
pricing, marketing and distribution at Quaker Oats. 159 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the injunction. 160
The Pepsico case is different from the initial three inevitable disclosure cases because in Pepsico, the market leader and not the competitor was the party hiring away an employee with the alleged trade
150. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 651; American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430; B.F
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102-04.
151. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 645; American Potash, 200 A.2d at 428; B.F
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 105.
152. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 645; American Potash, 200 A.2d at 429-31; B.F
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 103; see also Weinstein, supra note 134, at 227
n.72. A California appellate court apparently has also adopted the doctrine. See Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. Stephen White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680
( 1999)
153. There are a number of cases in several jurisdictions which are cited by
counsel as inevitable disclosure cases but which are actually contract cases.
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Varco, Int'l, 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982); Union
Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984); Weed Eater,
Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898 (Tex 1978).
154. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
155. ld. at 1263-64.
156. ld. at 1264-65.
157. ld. at 1265.
158. ld. at 1264.
159. ld. at 1266-67.
160. ld. at 1272.
0
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secret. 161 In addition, the value of Quaker Oats' trade secret to Pepsi,
a competitor, was obvious, but possibly less critical than in the three
prior cases. 162 Most troubling was that while the Seventh Circuit opinion acknowledged that the "mere fact that a person assumed a similar
position at a competitor does not, without more, make it 'inevitable
that he will use or disclose ... trade secret information' so as to entitle
plaintiff to an i~unction," 163 the court did not go further to offer
more guidance as to what does make it inevitable.
At present, there is no indication in Maryland case law that Maryland will adopt, in whole or in part, the inevitability doctrine.

C.

Does Size Really Matter?

Under the Maryland and Uniform Act's definition of a trade secret,
the size of or the amount of information contained in the trade secret
does not matter, assuming the other statutory requirements are
met. 164 The Maryland Act defines a trade secret simply as "information,"165 without any limitation as to the amount of the information. 166 In many cases, the size of the trade secret is not a factor
because the trade secret at issue is specific, singular and limited, such
as a source code or object code 167 or customer or patient list. 168
However, there has been recent trade secret litigation outside of
Maryland in which relatively large amounts of information are alleged
to be trade secrets. For example, in the "settled" Virginia trade secret
case of ServiceMaster v. Pletcher, 169 ServiceMaster, a large national
franchisor of cleaning businesses claimed that its whole "Business System" was a trade secret. 170 ServiceMaster required its franchisees to
use this Business System to conduct their cleaning business. 171 This
Business System was compromised of dozens of three inch, three ring
161. Compare id. at 1264 with Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 647; see American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430-31; B.F. Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102.
162. Compare Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1264 with Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 647;
American Potash, 200 A.2d at 430-31; B.F Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 102.
163. Pepsico, 54 F.3d at 1269 (quoting AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199,
1207 (7th Cir. 1987)).
164. See Mo. ConE ANN., CoM LAw II§ ll-1201(e); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1,
14 U .L.A. 438.
165. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM lAw II§ ll-120l(e).
166. !d.
167. Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 663 (4th Cir. 1993)
(defining object code as "'the binary language comprised of zeros and ones
through which the computer directly receives its instructions'").
168. Dworkin D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. 770, 551 A.2d 947 (1989)
(noting that patient or customer lists include names and addresses of those
listed).
169. Service Master v. Pletcher, Civil Action No. 00-942-A (court settled date)
(noting that this case is settled, and there is no confidentiality clause in the
Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release executed in this case).
170. !d.
171. !d.
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manuals, altogether consisting of thousands of pages of text and numerous video tapes. 172 The Business System also consisted of numerous periodic magazines and newsletters, technical bulletins, training
materials, training seminars, workshops, promotional materials, advertising materials, marketing materials, sales materials, invoices, and correspondence with third parties. 173 These materials covered virtually
every aspect of initiating, operating, and maintaining a cleaning
business. 174
Some courts have held that a whole franchise system can be protected as a trade secret. In Big 0 Tires, Inc. v. Granada Enterprises
Corp., 175 the court upheld plaintiff's claim that its whole "Big 0 System," compromised of "techniques, systems, details as to the Big 0
System, theory and practices, supplier lists, equipment standards, specials uses of equipment and equipment supplier lists," was a trade
secret. 176
In Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 177 a franchiser developed a comprehensive system for setting up and operating an advertising circular
business. 178 This system was compiled in an apparently voluminous
manual. 179 The plaintiff sought to enforce its written covenant not to
compete against the defendant in Colorado, which statutorily voided
such agreements unless it was to protect a trade secret. 180 The court
held that the whole manual was a trade secret. 181
There are other cases in Maryland, 182 and outside of Maryland, 183
which have held that large volumes of information are protected as
172. Id.
173. Jd.
174. Id. (noting that the franchisor now maintains a web site containing most of
these materials which is available only to franchises with the proper
password).
175. Business Franchise Guide (CCH) 'li 11,607, Case No. CV98-2298DT (C.D.
Cal. 1990).
176. Jd.
177. Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
178. Id. at 908.
179. Jd. at 909.
180. Id.; see also Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (b) (West 1994).
181. Gold Messenger, Inc., 937 P.2d at 911.
182. Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 460, 479
(D. Md. 1999) (holding that "plaintiff's extensive compilation of information and analysis in their business plan qualifies as a trade secret"); National
Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 432 (D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that a combination of information in the proposal book that reflected market research gathered from a larger pool of information was a
trade secret); Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Svcs., 931 F. Supp. 18, 38
(D. Mass. 1995) (noting that a set of service and repair manuals compiled
of both public and non public information by plaintiff was a trade secret).
183. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Atlech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (noting that ISC's compilations of valuable technological information guides, service manuals, and technical bulletins were all found to be
trade secrets); Comprehensive Tech. v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 737
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trade secrets. If the Maryland Act allows employers or franchisers to
classify such large volumes of information as trade secrets, then the
protection of such expansive information could lead to an unintended result. In the case of a departing employee, it may mean that
he cannot continue to work in the same industry. The employee's
departure would severely limit his job mobility because the information classified as a trade secret by the former employer is so broad that
it possibly encompasses the whole industry. Because necessity requires that the employee use or disclose some of that information at
his next job, the employee will be prevented from working in the same
industry.
However, the departing employee may defend such a claim by arguing that much of the information for which the employer seeks protection is general knowledge, publicly available, generally known,
and/ or readily ascertainable. 184 As set forth above, Maryland case law
clearly protects an employee by allowing him to depart from his employment with his general knowledge and skills. 185 Information that is
generally known or readily ascertainable cannot be protected as a
trade secret. 186 However, in order to restrict employees from using all
information in their subsequent employment, some employers
outside of Maryland are attempting to denominate as much information as possible as a trade secret. 187
If an employer can protect large volumes of information as a trade
secret, the effect of such protection could result in the functional
equivalent of a non-compete agreement without reasonable limitations as to time or geography. As stated above, trade secrets are not
limited in this way. 188 This is in contrast to Maryland's case law on
non-compete agreements, which requires that these agreements be
reasonable as to time and geography. 189

D.

Requirement of Independent Economic Value

The definition of a trade secret in the first Restatement requires
that the trade secret give the user an opportunity to obtain an advan-

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

(4th Cir. 1993) (stating that in order for compilation to be regarded as a
trade secret the combination of information itself must not be publicly
available).
Comprehensive Tech. v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 737 (4th Cir. 1993).
Space Aero Prods. Co. v. Darling, 238 Md. 93, 113, 208 A.2d. 74, 84 (1965).
Mo. CooE ANN, CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201(e)(1).
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See supra Part liLA.
Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973) ("[A]n employment contract ... will be upheld 'if the restraint is confined within limits
which are no wider as to area and duration than are reasonably necessary'
... " (quoting Ruhl v. Bartlett Tree Co., 245 Md. 118, 123-24, 225 A.2d 288,
291 (1967); Macintosh v. Brunswick, 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225
(1965))).
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tage over nonusers. 190 The Maryland 191 and Uniform Act's definition
of a trade secret requires that the secret information derive "independent economic value." 192 This quoted phrase, while seemingly unfathomable, has been interpreted by the courts to simply mean that
the trade secret information must give the owner of the secret some
competitive advantage, whether actual or potential. 193 The Maryland
and Uniform Acts do not state that the independent economic value
has to be substantial or significant. 194 The economic value has to be
more than de minimis. 195 In fact, the trade secret need only give the
owner "an opportunity to obtain an advantage." 196

E.

Requirement that Trade Secret Not Be Generally Known

The Maryland and Uniform Act's definition of a trade secret further requires that the trade secret not be generally known. 197 The
drafters of the Uniform Act and the courts are clear that "not generally known" does not mean not generally known to the public, but
instead, means not generally known to those in the relevant industry
or trade. 198 In trade secret litigation, the requirement that the information not be generally known is often a vigorously contested issue
and it can be a close factual issue for a judge or jury to decide. 199 For
example, consider whether a particular method of selling a product
or service is or is not generally known. A company may argue that it
has developed a program to sell a product or service and that the
company has spent considerable money, time, and effort on that program. 200 The company may have trained its employees to use it and
190. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
191. Swann, supra note 6, at 1056 (stating that "[o]nJuly 1, 1989, Maryland became the twenty-ninth state to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ... ").
192. Mo. ConE ANN, CoM. LAw II§ 11-1201 (noting that "[t]o qualify as a trade
secr~t under thi~ title, the information must: (1) hold independent economic value ... ) .
193. Electo-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900 (Minn.
1983).
194. See Mo. ConE ANN, CoM. LAw II § 11-1201.
195. See Mo. ConE ANN, CoM. LAw II § 11-1201.
196. REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS§ 757 cmt. b (stating that" [a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information ... which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors ... ").
197. See Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(e)(1) (stating that a required
element of a trade secret is that it "[d]erives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known"); UNIF. TRADE
SEcRETs AcT§ 1, 14 U.L.A. 437.
198. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1 cmt, 14 U.L.A. at 437. See generally, Precision
Moulding & Frame, Inc. v. Simpson Door, Co., 888 P.2d 1239, 1242-43
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that if the knowledge behind a trade secret
is "readily ascertainable," a plaintiff will not be able to establish that a trade
secret exists).
199. See, e.g., Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 788, 591 A.2d 578,
587 (1991).
200. See id. at 781, 591 A.2d at 584.
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maintain the secrecy of the program. 201 On the other hand, an employee departing that company who wants to use the same program
for her own benefit may argue that the method is generally known
because you can read a book at your local public library on sales or
marketing that would provide information about almost any sales
method. Further, a departing employee may also contend that the
sales method is generally known because several of the competitors of
the company use the same or similar method. 202 This is not unlikely
in a mature competitive industry.
In 1999, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided a case
concerning the requirement that an alleged trade secret not be generally known. In Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 203 the two founders of a company became aware of another company's discovery of a way to
separate toxins from medical waste and the founders thought they
could apply that process to recycling plastic. 204 The two asked Bond,
an engineer, to review the technology, and he concluded that it had
great economic potential. 205 Bond estimated that it would take six
months and about $75,000 to $100,000 to develop the technology. 206
As a result, the two founders and Bond fonned PolyCycle, licensed the
process from the inventor, and Bond became president of the company.207 Two years and $500,000 later, the technology was not ready
and Bond requested a salary. 208 The company was not yet profitable
and refused to pay Bond's request. 209 Bond left, telling PolyCycle he
had developed an alternative technology that did not belong to PolyCycle.210 He took all of the technology with him, including a machine, and computer files; he also deleted the computer files from
PolyCycle's network. 211
Bond contended that the technology was not a trade secret because
the components of the machine were all available on the open market
and the fundamental concept of breaking plastics into pieces and applying heated water and agitation was widely known in the plastics industry.212 The court disagreed with Bond, holding:
[O]nly Bond knows the "secret formula" of how small to
make the pieces of plastic, how much water to use, the appropriate temperature of the water, the proper level of agita201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 775, 591 A.2d at 581.
See id. at 787-88, 591 A.2d at 586-87.

127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 870 (1999).
at 368, 732 A.2d at 971.
at 369, 732 A.2d at 972.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 370, 732 A.2d at 972.

at 374, 732 A.2d at 971.
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tion to apply, and the length of the agitation process. As
appellee correctly points out, "[i] t is those elements, mixed
and processed precisely in a certain manner, that define the
PolyCycle process, just as much as the specific blend of ...
available ingredients defines Coca-Cola." 213
The court also dismissed defendant's argument that the technology
was generally known in the industry, stating:
Appellant's knowledge was not acquired by a general study
of technologies available in the market place. Appellant acquired his knowledge when Marks and Brown offered him
the opportunity to participate in the joint venture, and later,
when acting as an agent for PolyCycle, he utilized PolyCycle's
funds in the development process. 214
Perhaps one of the more interesting trade secret cases concerning
the meaning of "not generally known" is Religious Technology Center v.
Lerma, 215 involving the Church of Scientology. In 1991, the Church,
located in California, sued a disgruntled former member of the
church. 216 The defendant in that case filed an affidavit in the open
court file and attached thereto sixty-nine pages of church documents.217 The church claimed that the documents were protected by
the U.S. copyright laws and trade secret laws and sought to have the
records sealed. 218 However, the circuit court upheld the district
court's refusal to seal the file. 219 Subsequently, Lerma, another former church member, obtained a copy of the affidavit and the church
documents, and published them on the lnternet. 220 Thereafter, in
mid-1995, the church obtained a temporary restraining order from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
against Lerma, restricting Lerma from any further publication of the
affidavit and church documents, and a United States Marshall seized
Lerma's personal computer, disks, and copies of the documents. 221
In Lerma, the Church went to great lengths to protect the court filed
documents from being disclosed. 222 The court found that the Church
had been "checking that [court] file out [everyday] and holding it all
day to prevent anyone from seeing it, [however,] the file was not
sealed and obviously was available, upon request, to any member of
the public who wished to see it." 223 In fact, the file was made available
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

/d. at 375, 732 A.2d at 975.
Id. at 376, 732 A.2d at 976.
908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995).
Id. at 1364.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 1364-65.
/d.
/d. at 1365.
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to a reporter. 224 The ever-resourceful Washington Post sent a reporter
to California and obtained the documents from the clerk of the court
in the California case. 225 The Washington Post published an article
about the Church, and following publication of the article, the
Church sued the newspaper in Virginia. 226
However, despite the fact that the Church had gone to great
lengths to protect the court filed documents from the public, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the documents were not a trade secret. 227 The court reasoned
that the documents were generally known because they were in an
open court file available to the public and they were posted on the
Internet. 228 The court further stated:
Of even more significance is the undisputed fact that these
documents were posted on the Internet on July 31 and August 1, 1995. (Lerma Affidavit). On August 11, 1995, this
Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order among other
orders which directed Lerma to stop disseminating the
[Church] documents. However, that was more than ten days
after the documents were posted on the Internet, where they
remained potentially available to the millions of Internet
users around the world.
As other courts who have dealt with similar issues have observed, "posting works to the Internet makes them 'generally
known'" at least to the relevant people interested in the news
group. Once a trade secret is posted on the Internet, it is
effectively part of the public domain, impossible to
retrieve. 229
In the more recent case of Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics
Corp., 230 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
took a different position with regard to trade secrets that were filed in
an open court file but not posted on the Internet. In that case, a party
had inadvertently filed documents, which it alleged were trade secrets,
in another court proceeding. 231 The documents had been in the
open court file for several months. 232 The Fourth Circuit referred to
the Lerma case, but reached a different result:
In holding that the [Scientology Church's] works were not
trade secrets when the Post acquired them, the court specifically relied on both of these factors [documents in an open
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 1368.
/d.
/d. (citations omitted).

174 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999).
/d. at 415.
/d.
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court file for 28 months and published on the Internet].
First, it noted that the documents' extended presence in the
court's public files - from which the Post had obtained its
own copy - made them no longer secret. Importantly,
though, the court reasoned that the documents' posting on
the Internet was "[o]f even more significance" than their extended presence in public records: "posting works to the Internet makes them "generally known" at least to the relevant
people interested in the news group." As a result, the court
correctly found that the information which had been both
disclosed in public court files and made "generally known"
by Internet publication had lost its trade secret status. 233
The Hoechst court believed that there was no suggestion that the
document was published on the Internet. The only issue was whether
it was present in the district court's public files. 234 The court held
that, under the Act, the mere presence of the information "in the
district court's public files, in and of itself, did not make the information contained in the document 'generally known' for purposes of the
Act."235
The court concluded that there was a material difference between
information deposited in an open court file available to the public
and information available on the Internet. 236 Of course, the information is publicly available in both instances. 237 However, the Hoechst
court determined that information in an open court file may or may
not be generally known, but it is generally known if it is posted on the
Internet. 238 While the logic of this is debatable, the distinction that
the court is making is rational. The contents of court files are publicly
available but are not as accessible as information posted on the Internet.239 However, if and when court files become available on the
Internet, the distinction made by the Court in the Hoechst case may be
less meaningful. 240 At some not too distant time, this current distinction may again be the subject of litigation.
233. !d. at 419.
234. !d.
235. !d. (citing Religious Tech. Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D.
Va. 1995).
236. !d.
237. To see how the information was publicly available in Lerma see supra notes
225-29. To see how the information was publicly available in Hoechst see
infra notes 238-40.
238. Hoechst, 174 F.3d at 419.
239. !d. at 419 (noting that the information deposited in the district court's public files "in and of itself, did not make the information contained in the
document 'generally known'").
240. For discussions of trade secrets and the Internet, see Victoria A. Cundiff,
Trade Secrets and the Internet: A Practical Perspective, 14 No.8 CoMPUTER LAw.
6 (1997); Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade
Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 1151 (1996).
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In Montgomery County Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master
Corporation,2 41 a voluntary association of realtors brought an action alleging, among other things, a misappropriation of a trade secret by a
photographic service. 242 The realtors' association had a database of
real estate listings that the photo service used to provide realtors with
photographs of real estate. 243 Named the "Multiple Listing Service,"
the database was a computerized listing of real estate in the Montgomery County area available for sale, which the plaintiff compiled and
disseminated to its members. 244 The court found that the "information in the MLS database [was] not a secret; to the contrary, it is distributed widely to its realtor members and potential purchasers." 245
In essence, the court held that the information was generally known
to the industry because it was not kept secret, but was widely distributed in the industry. 246

F.

Requirement that Trade Secrets Not Be Readily Ascertainable

The Maryland Act and the Uniform Act also require that a trade
secret not be readily ascertainable by proper means. 247 The Commentary to the Uniform Act lists several proper means, including: 1. Discovery by independent invention; 2. Reverse engineering; 3. Discovery
under a license; 4. Observing the product or service on public use or
display; and 5. Review of publicly available literature. 248
While the Maryland Act contains a requirement that a trade secret
not be generally known, there is no line in the sand as to when information is readily ascertainable. 249 This is also a factual issue that is
often litigated. 250 A common example in trade secret litigation is the
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

878 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1995).
!d. at 804.
/d. at 808-09.
/d. at 808.
/d. at 814.
/d.

In a case of misappropriation of trade secrets, the Uniform Act requires
that the secret be acquired through improper means. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438. The Uniform Act defines "improper means" to
include "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of breach
of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
means." !d. The Maryland Act contains identical language. See Mo. ConE
ANN., CoM. LAw II§ ll-1201(b).
248. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 1 cmt, 14 U.L.A. 439.
249. See infra Part III.F.
250. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the identities of opthamologists who were high volume implanters of
manufacturers' lenses were not readily ascertainable); see also Eaton Corp.
v. Appliance Valves Co., 634 F. Supp. 974, 980-81 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding
that patent information readily available to the public and removed from
employer's files did not amount to a misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential information); Crown Holding Corp. v. Larson, 410 N.W.2d
373, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that a confidentiality agreement
terminated with the lifting of a temporary restraining order).
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case of a departing employee who takes the customer list with him
when he departs to work at a competing business, which may even be
the employee's own start up company. The former employer will argue that its customer list was developed only after many years of effort
and great expenditures on advertising, client development, and salaries for salesmen. On the other hand, the departing employee, who
has appropriated the list, will argue that the customer list constitutes
information which is readily ascertainable through common business
sources such as telephone books, trade magazines, or published industry information sources.
The seminal case in Maryland on this topic is Fulton Grand Laundry
Co. v.johnson. 251 In this case,Johnson, an employee of a laundry company, drove a laundry route as part of his required duties. 252 Mter
three years of employment, Johnson departed from the laundry company and started his own laundry business. 253 Before he left, Johnson
solicited the customers of his previous laundry route. 254 The court
held that the identity of the laundry customers on the laundry route
was not a trade secret because those identities could be readily ascertained by merely observing the driver on his laundry route. 255
In 1989, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided the case
of Alan M. Dworkin, D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal, 256 a case that predated
the Maryland Act. 257 There, a professional association of dentists
sought injunctive relief, accounting, and damages from dentists formerly in practice with the association, alleging wrongful use of patient
information and unfair competition. 258 The departing dentists compiled a list of patients from the records of the professional association
before their employment with the professional association ended. 259
Mter resigning from the professional association, the departing dentists mailed relocation announcements only to patients for whom they
had been the primary dentist. 260 The relocation announcements did
not solicit the patient's business. 261 The court found that the patient
list was not kept secret and that the departing dentists had a profes-

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753 (1922).
!d. at 360, 117 A. at 753.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 361-62, 117 A. at 753-54.
77 Md. App. 774, 551 A.2d 947 (1989).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that the Maryland Act
was passed in 1980).
Blumenthal, 77 Md. App. at 778, 551 A.2d at 948.
!d. at 777, 551 A.2d at 948.
!d. at 780, 551 A.2d at 949.
See id. (noting that the announcements only informed patients of the
change of address and did not purport to offer superior services).
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sional duty to inform their patients of their relocation. 262 Accordingly, the court held that the patient list was not a trade secret. 263
In Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 264 the court of special appeals, apply-·
ing the Maryland Act, held that a marketing strategy was not a trade
secret because the information was easily obtainable from the marketplace.265 At trial, the circuit court concluded that Optic's marketing
strategy could be readily ascertained simply by talking with prospective purchasers of Optics. 266 Furthermore, the trial court found that
Optic's marketing strategy was subject to change and therefore useless
to a competitor. 267
In Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. FMC Corp./Agricultural Products
Group, 268 FMC, a manufacturer, gave a customer list ofYork, a distributor and subsidiary of Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, to
one of York's principal competitors. 269 The plaintiff alleged this to be
a misappropriation of a trade secret, while FMC asserted that the list
was readily ascertainable. 270 The customer list provided the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of York's top fifty customers. 271 Apparently, the details of the prices and quantities of each product purchased by each customer were not disclosed. 272 The court found that
the names and addresses ofYork's customers were obtainable through
public sources, such as the phone directory and trade associations. 273
The plaintiff argued that it put substantial effort into compiling the
information on the list and that FMC actually paid for it. 274 The court
concluded that such information could be "gathered as a matter of
course as part ofYork's day-to-day operations." 275
However, in the case of Motor City Bagels, L.L. C. v. American Bagel
Co., 276 the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
found that a business plan was a trade secret even though the business
plan contained some facts ascertainable from the market place and
some public information. 277 In this case, two recent business school
graduates were investigating and negotiating the purchase of a bagel
franchise, and prepared an extensive business plan assessing the via262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 782, 551 A.2d at 950-51.
Id. at 782, 551 A.2d at 951.
87 Md. App. 770, 591 A. 2d 578 (1991).
Id. at 788, 591 A. 2d 587.
Id.
Id. at 787-88, 591 A.2d at 587.
107 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2000).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693
Id.
50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 1999).
Id. at 479.
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bility of a bagel franchise. 278 The franchisor with whom they were
negotiating disclosed the plan to other prospective franchisees. 279
The court held that "while the business plan at issue [did] contain
some public information and facts ascertainable from the marketplace, it likewise include[d] personal insights and analysis brought to
bear through diligent research and by marshaling a large volume of
information." 280 Unlike the marketing strategy in Optic Graphics, an
attempt to independently duplicate the business plan would require
extensive research and analysis. 281
While the Maryland Act is clear that information that is generally
known or readily ascertainable cannot be a trade secret, combinations
of generally known information, combinations of readily ascertainable
information, and combinations of both, can be trade secrets. In Motor
City Bagel, the court stated that "(t]he fact that individual forms in
marketing material or in plaintiff's proposal book were compilations
of public information does not itself preclude a finding that the combination of the included elements affords a competitive advantage
and is not itself in the public domain." 282 The court also cited, with
approval, the Fourth Circuit, stating that "although a trade secret cannot subsist in information in the public domain, it can subsist in a
combination of such information as long as the combination is itself a
secret. " 283

G.

Requirement of Reasonable Efforts to Maintain Secrecy

The Maryland Act and the Uniform Act also provide that a trade
secret is protectable only if it "is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." 284 There are no
qualifications or exceptions to this requirement. However, it is also
clear from this quoted language that complete secrecy is not required. 285 Sensibly, trade secret protection is not lost if the trade secret isodisclosed in confidence to those that need to know it, such as
employees, agents, suppliers, subcontractors, and others. 286 However,
courts have also interpreted this language to require that a trade secret owner demonstrate that he pursued an active course of conduct
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 466.
/d. at 478.
/d. at 479.
Id.
Molar City Bagel, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 479 (citing Nat'I Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
/d. (citing Comprehensive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d
730, 736 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1201 (e) (2); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 439.
See Tabs Assocs., Inc. v. Brohawn, 59 Md. App. 330, 475, A.2d 1203 (1984).
Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, 397 S.E.2d 110, 113
(Va. 1990) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475
(1974)).
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to keep the information secret. 287 Doing nothing is not enough, even
though doing nothing has been good enough in the past to protect
the secret. 288 It is also true that while the owner of a trade secret must
demonstrate active conduct, the trade secret "owner need not take
heroic measures." 289
In some cases, courts have held that not much is required to protect
information as a trade secret. In Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting &
Packaging, 290 the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's
decision that the foam company had used reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of its trade secret, referring only to the fact that the
company had required confidential information agreements from all
its "employees, suppliers, customers, and contractors . . . ."291 However, in many cases, a court will look much more closely at the facts of
the case. In a Fourth Circuit case applying the Maryland Act, the
court closely looked at the facts to determine if reasonable efforts
were employed to maintain secrecy. In Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 292 the developer and owner of a software program that designed
subway tunnels sued a licensee and its contractor, the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, for misappropriation of that
trade secret. 293 The defendants argued that the information was not a
trade secret because the software was widely disclosed, mass marketed,
and that its existence and its abilities were not secret. 294 The defendants further argued that the plaintiff software owner even offered a
demonstration version of the software for sale for $100. 295 However,
the court looked closely at the facts, found that only six or seven people inquired about the demonstration version, and none were sold. 296
In deciding the case, the court found that the owner took measures
that were reasonable under the circumstances to protect the seuecy
of the software. 297 Additionally, the court found that the company
licensed only two object code versions of its software and they were
licensed under a confidentiality agreement, the company used a password to prevent access to the program in-house and for licensed ver287. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Mass. 1972).
288. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4 (Pa. 1904) (holding
that there was an implied agreement of secrecy between the plaintiff and its
customers, who were provided with blueprints as a means of facilitating
transactions).
289. CoHEN & GuTTERMAN, supra note 13, at 15 n.51.
290. 397 S.E.2d llO (Va. 1990).
291. Id. at ll2, 114.
292. 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993).
293. Id. at 657.
294. Id. at 663.
295. Id. at 663-64.
296. Id. at 664.
297. Id.
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sions, and there was no other unauthorized person who ever obtained
a copy of the software. 298
Of course, efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances will
vary from case to case. Some examples are:

1. [C]lassifying and labeling certain documents as trade secrets;
2. restricting access to certain materials or areas;
3. limiting disclosures within the company only to those individuals who need the trade secrets in order to perform their jobs
properly;
4. implementing badge or other electronic monitoring systems;
5. advising employees of the existence of trade secrets and conditioning employment on signing confidentiality agreements;
6. requiring consultants, customers, vendors, and ancillary service providers to sign confidentiality agreements;
7. implementing periodic internal review procedures regarding
inventions, periodicals, marketing materials, and government
filings;
8. restricting access to computers, copiers, fax machines, and
trash receptacles;
9. performing security checks of employees, visitors, and others
with access to trade secrets; and
10. using protective orders when disclosing trade secrets in the
course of litigation. 299
Not only does the trade secret owner have to take measures that are
reasonable under the circumstances to protect the secrecy of the trade
secret, the trade secret owner must also make sure its licensee also
takes such measures. In Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc., 300
the court held that even if the owner of a trade secret meets the secrecy requirements of the Maryland Act, it must also make sure, if it
licenses the trade secret to another, that the owner takes steps to
make sure that the licensee also treats the information as secret. 301 If
the owner does not, any disclosure by the licensee of the information
to others may not be protected by the Maryland Act.
A lawyer must advise and assist his clients with regard to measures to
protect trade secrets. Today's numerous trade secret law suits, not
only in Maryland, but all over the country, are ad hoc testimonials to
the fact that many companies still do not take measures that are reasonable under the circumstances to protect their trade secrets. 302 A
trade secret owner may well consider the implementation of a trade
secret protection program, designed by counsel, to protect such
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

/d.

& GUTrERMAN, supra note 13, at 89-90.
107 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2000).
!d. at 693.
See supra Part III.
CoHEN
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secrets from disclosure and to increase the owner's probability of success in future litigation involving the misappropriation of the trade
secret. 303
H.

Respondeat Superior

While there does not appear to be any case in Maryland determining whether the Maryland Act precludes the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, 304 a recent case in Virginia held that the
Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (''Virginia Act") does not preclude the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In Newport News Industrial v. Dynamic Testing, Inc., 305 a long-time employee of
a ship building company invented and helped develop a shock mount
for electric equipment for use by the United States Navy. 306 The ship
building company asked DTI, a testing company, to test the mount. 307
The employee, who invented the mount, was hired by the testing company and immediately began work on developing a competing shock
mount. 308 From the employee's computer at the shipbuilding company, and while still employed by the company, the employee had detailed the design of the competing mount. 309 The shipbuilding
company brought an action against the testing company and its subsidiaries on numerous counts, including misappropriation of trade secret.310 Defendant claimed that they could not be vicariously liable
for the misappropriation because the Virginia Act precluded the imposition of liability under the theory of respondeat superior. 311 The defendants contended that the Virginia Act failed to explicitly provide
for respondeat superior liability and that the Virginia Act's preemptive
provision precluded the application of the doctrine. 312 The Virginia
Act's preemptive provision states that this chapter" 'displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this Commonwealth providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.' " 31 ~ This
303. See Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Protecting Trade Secrets & Confidential Business
Infrmnation (with Farms), 44 PRAc. LAw. 71 (July 1998).
304. BLAcK's LAw DrcnoNARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "respondeat superior" as "[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of
employment or agency").
305. 130 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001).
306. Id. at 746.
307. Id. at 747.
308. Id. at 747-48.
309. Id. at 748.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 750.
312. Id. (noting the VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1- 341 (Mitchie 2001)).
313. Id.
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Virginia provision is similar in all material aspects to the Maryland
provision at Section 11-1207. 314
In its opinion, the court, citing the Restatement (Second) of Agenry'n 5
and Virginia case law, 316 held that "the doctrine of respondent superior is thoroughly ensconced in Virginia law" 317 and that the preemptive provision of the Virginia Act does not displace the doctrine of
respondeat superior because that doctrine is a "legal precept that presupposes the existence of an underlying claim and assesses liability not
because of the act giving rise to the claim but because of a certain
status." 318 The court noted that reaching this result was consistent
with the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in similar
contexts, such as Virginia's conspiracy to "injure others in trade or
business statute" and the Lanham Act. 319

N.
A.

OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Equitable Relief

Because of the nature of the injury suffered from a misappropriation of a trade secret, money damages may be an inadequate form of
relief and equitable relief may be necessary. In recognition of this,
section ll-1202(a) of the Maryland Act and section 2(a) of the Uniform Act specifically provide that a court may order an injunction in
the case of actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret. 320
A court order imposing the i~unction can provide that the injunction
shall terminate when the trade secret has ceased to exist. 321 However,
a court may continue the injunction for an even longer period in order to eliminate any commercial advantage that otherwise would be
derived from the misappropriation of a trade secret. 322 It is notable
that even threatened misappropriation is the proper subject of an injunction under both Acts. 323 However, it is unclear how a threat of
misappropriation fits within the Maryland and Uniform Act's definition of misappropriation, because, as we have seen, the definition of
misappropriation only refers to the acquisition, use, or disclosure of
314. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1207; VA. ConE ANN.§ 59.1-344 (Mitchie
2001).
315. Newport News, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
316. Id. at 750 (citing Giant ofMd., Inc. v. Eager, 515 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1999)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 751.
319. Id. at 754 n.8.
320. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § ll-1202(a); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449.
321. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § ll-1202(b); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449.
322. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § ll-1202(b); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449.
323. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1202(a); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449.
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trade secrets and does not have any language specifically referring to
the threat thereof. 324
When the Conference adopted various amendments to the Uniform Act in 1985, one of those amendments added language to subpart b of section 2 of the Uniform Act concerning injunctive relief in
the case of "exceptional circumstances." 325 This new language is also
in the Maryland Act. The new Maryland language provides that:
(c) Payment of royalty -In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for
which use could have been prohibited ....
(e) "Exceptional circumstances defined"- In this section, "exceptional circumstances" includes, a material and prejudicial
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to
know of misappro~riation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable. 32

B.

Damages

1.

Actual Loss, Unjust Enrichment, and Reasonable Royalty

Section 11-1203 of the Maryland Act and section 3 of the Uniform
Act provide that damages for the misappropriation of a trade secret
can include damages for actual loss to the trade secret owner. 327 The
Acts also provide for those damages stemming from the misappropriator's unjust enrichment that were not factored into the computation of actual loss. 328 In addition, both Acts state that damages
can also be measured by a reasonable royalty in lieu of any other
damages. 329
324. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1202(c); see also supra notes 118,65 and
accompanying text.
325. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449; see also supra notes 59-60
and accompanying text.
326. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1202(c),(e).
327. ld. § 11-1203; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455.
328. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1203(b) (stating that damages may include "[t]he unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not
taken into account in computing actual loss"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr
§ 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455 (stating that "[d]amages can include ... the unjust
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account computing actual loss").
329. Mn. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1203(c); UNrF. TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455. One commentator has even argued that the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1994) (RICO) is applicable to causes of action based on the misappropriation of trade secrets. See Thomas P. Heed, Comment, Misappropriation of
Trade Secrets: The Last Civil RICO Cause of Action That Works, 30 J. MARsHALL
L. REv. 207, 235-42 (1996). RICO provides for treble damages and legal
fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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Measuring damages by a royalty amount instead of actual loss or
enrichment is an interesting option for plaintiffs. Such a measurement option may be advantageous for some plaintiffs for a number of reasons. First, plaintiffs may not be able to readily determine
their own actual losses because the defendant may have kept the misappropriation a secret and the plaintiff may not be aware of or be able
to reasonably calculate the effects of the misappropriation of plaintiff's trade secret or business. Second, plaintiffs may not be able to
calculate the defendant's unjust enrichment because the defendant
may not fully disclose or properly calculate the amount he has profited as a result of the misappropriation. Thus, a royalty amount may
be much easier for the plaintiff to prove because the information concerning its own trade secret is readily available and the plaintiff is already aware of its value.
From a defendant's point of view, however, measuring damages by a
royalty amount may be disadvantageous. For instance, because the defendant may only have had the secret for a short time, may not have
been able to use it to its full potential, and may not have generated
much money from it because it was wrongfully obtained, the defendant may suffer a greater loss if damages are measured by a reasonable royalty. Also, in some cases the defendant may not have all of the
facts concerning the secret to be able to disprove the alleged value
that the plaintiff attributes to the secret.
Maryland may have one of the very few reported cases concerning
the measurement of damages by awarding a reasonable royalty. 330 In
Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel, Co., 331 the court, applying
Virginia's unjust enrichment law, found that the plaintiffs had not introduced any evidence establishing that the defendants "were enriched 'at the expense of the plaintiffs." 332 Citing section 11-1203 (b)
of the Maryland Act, the court concluded that the plaintiffs "could
have argued that they were entitled to monetary damages in the form
of royalties as a result of the defendants' unauthorized distribution of
their business plan to prospective franchises." 333
ur~ust

2.

Exemplary Damages

Under section 11-1203 (d) of the Maryland Act and section 3(b) of
the Uniform Act, a court may award exemplary damages, not exceeding twice the award for general misappropriation damages, if there is
330. For one of the few reported cases discussing measuring damages by a royalty amount, see American Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F. Supp.
1476 (E.D. Va. 1994), amended by 867 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1994) (amending the court's awarding of attorney fees).
331. 50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 1999).
332. !d. at 477-78.
333. !d. at 4 79-80.
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a willful and malicious misappropriation. 334 Some states do not have
any punitive or exemplary damages provision in their state uniform
trade secrets act. 335 Other states that do award punitive or exemplary
damages in their uniform trade secrets acts have a cap on their damage provisions. 336

C.

Attorney Fees

Section 11-1204 of the Maryland Act and section 4 of the Uniform
Act specifically provide that a court may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party if there is a willful and malicious misappropriation.337 Both Acts also provide that reasonable attorney's fees will
be awarded if a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if a
motion to terminate an injunction is made or requested in bad
faith. 338 Although "willful and malicious" and "bad faith" are two different standards, the use of different standards may nonetheless be
appropriate because the types of acts and actors are different. 339 However, both bad faith and willful and malicious are interpreted by the
courts to require egregious conduct of a similar degree. 340 As the fol334. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1203(d); UNrF. TRADE SECRETS Acr
§ 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 455.
335. A few of the states that do not have any punitive or exemplary damage
provision in their state uniform trade secrets act are Arkansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, and Nebraska. See ARK. ConE ANN.§ 4-75-606 (2001) (allowing
damages only for actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation); MrcH. CoMP. LAws§ 445.1904 (Supp. 2001) (permitting a plaintiff
to recover damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation); Mrss. ConE ANN. § 75-26-7 (1999) (failing to state whether a
court may award punitive and exemplary damages); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87504 (1999) (failing to address whether a plaintiff may be awarded any exemplary damages).
336. States that have some type of cap for punitive or exemplary damages provisions are Alabama, Colorado, and Idaho. See ALA. ConE§§ 8-27-4 (1993)
(permitting an award of exemplary damages that may not "exceed the actual award made under subdivision (1)"); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-74-104
(1999) (stating that a court may award exemplary damages in an amount
not exceeding the award made under subsection ( 1) of their section");
IDAHO CoDE§ 48-803 (1997) (stating that "the court may award exemplary
damages in amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection
(1) of this section").
337. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II§ 11-1204; UNrF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 4, 14
U.L.A. 459; see also Mo. R. 1-341.
338. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1204; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 4, 14
U.L.A. 459.
339. See Am. Sales, 862 F. Supf-. at 1480-81 (explaining that "willful and malicious" conduct requires il -will and is a very high standard to meet for punitive damages); see also Optic Graphics, 87 Md. App. at 789-90, 591 A.2d at 58788 (noting that an example of bad faith is continuing a court action for
malicious reasons and that proving bad faith requires clear evidence that
the action was without merit and taken for improper purposes).
340. For a discussion of egregious punitive damages in willful and malicious
cases, see Am. Sales, 862 F. Supp. at 1480-81. For a discussion of egregious
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lowing cases demonstrate, the award of attorney's fees under the Maryland Act is difficult to achieve.
For instance, in Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 341 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered the award of attorney fees under the
Maryland Act. 342 Here, a company president developed and modified
plastic recycling technology and a machine both which were trade
secrets of the company. 343 When he left the company, he misappropriated the trade secrets, taking all of the information pertaining to
the technology with him. 344 In addition, he deleted all of the information from the corporation's computers. 345
The Bond court affirmed the trial court's finding that the president
had willfully and maliciously misappropriated the company's trade secret and upheld its award of attorney's fees. 346 However, in reaching a
decision, the court focused not on the misappropriation of the secret
technique, but on the deletion of the files from PolyCycle's computers, which the court found harmed PolyCycle from carrying out its
stated corporate purpose. 347
In Optic Graphics, 348 claims of breach of a written confidentiality
agreement and misappropriation of a trade secret were before the
court. 349 During the course of the case, it was determined that the
alleged confidentiality agreement of the former employee was actually
forged, bringing into question whether the breach of contract claim
should have been brought or maintained even after the forgery had
been determined. 350 The court reversed the trial court's imposition
of attorney fees and expenses based on the allegation that the claim of
misappropriation of a trade secret was filed in bad faith. 351 However,

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

punitive damages in bad faith cases, see optic Graphics, 87 Md. App. 789,
591 A.2d at 587-88.
127 Md. App. 365, 732 A.2d 970 (1999).
/d. at 380-83, 732 A.2d at 977-79.
/d. at 369-70, 732 A.2d at 972. See also supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the facts and holding of this case.
Bond, 127 Md. App. at 370, 732 A.2d at 972; see also supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
Bond, 127 Md. App. at 370, 732 A.2d at 972; see also supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
Bond, 127 Md. App. at 384-85, 732 A.2d at 979-80. The Bond court defined
"willfull," stating that "[i]n a civil action the word [willfully] often denotes
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from
accidental." /d. at 381, 732 A.2d at 978 (citing BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
1600 (7th ed. 1999)). It also defined "malice" as "the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without legal justification or excuse. An act is malicious if it is
done knowingly and deliberately, for an improper motive and without legal
justification." /d. at 382, 732 A.2d at 978 (citing Elliott v. Kapferman, 58
Md. App. 510, 526, 475 A.2d. 960 (1984)).
/d. at 377-80, 732 A.2d at 97fr.77.
87 Md. App. 770, 591 A.2d 578 (1991).
/d. at 770, 591 A.2d at 578.
/d. at 779, 591 A.2d at 582-83.
/d. at 794, 591 A.2d at 590.
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the court remanded to the lower court that portion of the case concerning the claim for attorney fees and expenses related to breach of
the contract claim. 352
D.

Preservation of Secrecy

During the course of a court proceeding, section 11-1205 of the
Maryland Act and section 5 of the Uniform Act require that a court
"preserve the secrecy of [any] alleged trade secret by reasonable
means . . . . "353 Both the Uniform Act and Maryland Act set forth
examples of means by which an alleged trade secret can be preserved,
including (1) protective orders during discovery; (2) in camera hearings; (3) sealing records; and (4) ordering persons involved in the
litigation not to disclose the information. 354
Of course, the parties and the court can also protect the secrecy of
discoverable information under the Maryland Rules by stipulation 355
and by motion for protective order. 356 In most cases, it may be in the
best interest of all of the parties involved to agree to protect this information because quite frequently in trade secret litigation the alleged
trade secrets of both plaintiff and defendant are discoverable. In such
cases, counsel for all of the parties may prepare and submit to the
court a joint motion for a protective order as well as a proposed order
to restrict the disclosure of confidential information in discovery, depositions, hearings, and at trial. Such a protective order may have provisions allowing: (1) limited disclosure of specified information to
counsel and parties; and (2) limited disclosure of other specified information to counsel only or special masters only. Submitting such an
order often minimizes legal fees and court time.
E.

Statute of Limitations

Section 11-1206 of the Maryland Act and section 6 of the Uniform
Act set forth a statute of limitations of three years for misappropriation actions. 357 This three year period starts after the misappropriation is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of
reasonable diligence. 358 Two states, Illinois and Maine, have, respec352. /d. at 795, 591 A.2d at
353. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM.
U.L.A. 461.
354. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM.
U.L.A. 461.
355. Mo. R. 2-401 (g).
356. Mo. R. 2-403(a) (8).
357. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM.
U.L.A. 462.
358. Mo. ConE ANN., CoM.
U.L.A. 462.

590.
LAw II § 11-1205; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 5, 14
LAw II § 11-1205; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 5, 14

LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 6, 14
LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 6, 14
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tively, a five and four year statute of limitations in their uniform trade
secrets acts. 359
F.

Effect on Other Law

Section 11-1207 of the Maryland Act and section 7 of the Uniform
Act state that the Acts displace conflicting existing law providing for
remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets. 360 The Acts do not
effect: (1) contractual remedies; (2) other civil remedies not based on
misappropriation of trade secrets; and (3) criminal remedies. 361 Furthermore, the Commentary to the Uniform Act specifically states that
the Uniform Act is not intended to affect the law concerning contractual provisions prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets and covenants
by employees not to compete against their employers. 362
An interesting question arises as to whether debts related to misappropriation can be discharged in bankruptcy. Certainly if a disgruntled employee misappropriates a trade secret and his former employer
obtains a judgment against him, the employee may file for bankruptcy, whether this debt is discharged in bankruptcy is beyond the
scope of this Article. 363
V.

CONCLUSION

Twelve years have passed since the Maryland legislature enacted the
Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 364 During this time, Maryland
courts have decided numerous cases under the Maryland Act that
have interpreted the Act's provisions. 365 A critical review of the Act
and much of the reported Maryland trade secrets case law suggests
that the Maryland Act currently meets the needs of both the high-tech
and low-tech trade secret litigants for a unified and comprehensive
body of law. 366 The increasing volume of case law under the Act reflects a continuing need for this unified and comprehensive body of
law governing the protection of trade secrets. This case law also suggests that many Maryland businesses are not making efforts that are
359. See 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/7 (West 2001); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 1547 (West 1997).
360. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 76, 14
U.L.A. 463.
361. Mo. CooE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1206; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 7, 14
U.L.A. 463.
362. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT§ 7 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 463. Nevada and South Carolina have criminal penalties for the theft of a trade secret. See NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 600A.035 (Mitchie 2001); S.C. CooE ANN.§ 39-8-90 (Law. Coop. Supp. 2001).
363. See generally Beverly A. Berneman, Caveat Trade Secret Misappropriator: The
Discharge of Trade Secret Misappropriation Debts, III J. MARsHALL CENTER FOR
INTELL. PROP. L. NEws SouRCE 3, Winter 2002.
364. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
365. See supra Parts III and IV.
366. See supra Parts III and IV.
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reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of their
trade secrets. 367 Accordingly, Maryland lawyers should advise their clients of the need for a comprehensive and demonstrable program to
establish and maintain efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of such trade secrets.

367. See supra Parts III and N.

